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Theme: The international surveillance of infectious diseases is being addressed through 
international, national and non-state networks. 
 
 
Summary: Within the next century there will be a rise in the number of new infectious 
pathogens, while the drug-resistance of existing pathogens such as dengue, meningitis 
and tuberculosis will also increase. The need to prepare for the pandemics we can 
predict, let alone the ones that we can’t, has led to calls for investment in preventive 
efforts. One area of particular growth is infectious disease surveillance networks, set up 
by both state and non-state actors. International disease surveillance networks exist in a 
variety of formats: email alert networks, sophisticated laboratory diagnostic networks, cell 
phone alerts and web scan systems. Generally, the global response to the proliferation of 
these networks has been positive. Having surveillance in place for situations when either 
states do not have the capacity to respond to an outbreak or may be tempted to cover up 
an outbreak, makes the rest of the world safer. But what are the potential political 
obstacles to the proliferation of infectious disease surveillance networks, and will more 
‘disease watchers’ create secure foundations for protecting the global community from 
‘public health emergencies of international concern’ (PHEIC)? 
 
While states do seem to have responded positively to the proliferation of global 
surveillance networks and have accepted the need to strengthen their own health 
systems, as evidenced by universal acceptance of the revised International Health 
Regulations, which includes the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters-based 
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) in 2005. We are far from being 
able to confidently believe that official (government) or unofficial (non-state) managed 
infectious disease surveillance networks will enhance security from infectious disease 
outbreaks. This ARI outlines three reasons for caution: (1) state capacity is still weak in 
areas where the greatest numbers of new pathogens have been diagnosed; (2) the ability 
to identify where a disease outbreak has occurred does not alleviate the political 
obstacles to international efforts to contain such an outbreak; and (3) we are yet to 
establish a correlation between the multiplication of surveillance networks and better 
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Analysis: It is important to remember that just three decades ago there was some 
confidence amongst public health officials that the risk of infectious disease had 
decreased. It was widely believed that new treatments, vaccines and knowledge of 
microbes would lead to the eradication of infectious disease as a major cause of death.1 
This optimism was short lived. In the 1980s, the outbreak and spread of HIV/AIDS 
followed by the resurgence of stronger microbe-resistant pathogens, such as malaria, TB, 
meningitis and dengue fever, were compounded by the fear that bioterrorists might use 
deadly pathogens as a weapon of war. New infectious pathogens have been discovered 
at the rate of one per year over the last two decades.2 In the last 15 years, serious 
infectious disease discoveries have included Lassa and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers in 
Africa, variants of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in Europe, meningococcal meningitis W135, 
Nipah virus in Malaysia and the West Nile virus in the Americas. In addition, the recent 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak (2002-03) and the threat of a 
pandemic arising from the H5N1 Avian Influenza strain that originated amongst poultry in 
East Asia in 2003, prompted some to argue that the world cannot escape a potential 
epidemic influenza that could kill anywhere between 2 and 12 million people.3 These 
developments have all served to increase calls for infectious diseases to be targeted as a 
threat to national security.4 
 
WHO came to the forefront of these calls after the 1994 outbreak of plague in India 
revealed its own institutional limitations in providing timely advice and response measures 
to states under the 1969 International Health Regulations. By 1995, the US was receiving 
domestic reports on the threat of new emerging diseases, leading to calls for a revision to 
the International Health Regulations (IHR) at the 1995 World Health Assembly. The new 
Regulations, it was argued, should alert states to a broader category of public health 
emergencies. The negative economic impact of a plague outbreak in India and 
neighbouring states indicated the need for a mediator, such as WHO, to advise the 
affected state and manage the information flow to the rest of the world. This voice needed 
to be trusted by states and WHO fitted this role. Various WHO reports argued that a 
revised IHR would allow WHO to end the flow of misinformation and ensure that all actors 
were cognisant of their roles and responsibility, whether at seaports, airports, executive 
level of government or WHO headquarters itself.5 With a new appreciation of how a 
disease outbreak in one state could have a ricochet effect across the world, states agreed 
and the global response to SARS demonstrated how ready they were for WHO to take on 
this significant new role in health governance. When individuals reported via ProMED6 
mail news of an epidemic in Guangzhou, China, the Chinese government at first denied 
that the respiratory disease was different to atypical pneumonia. WHO headquarters 
directly managed the information flow and with its regional counterpart, the Western 
Pacific Regional Office, took a leading role in advising states, media and the medical 
community on how to proceed in the months that followed as the disease travelled from 
China to Hong Kong to Singapore and eventually to Canada. The key reason why WHO 
was able to assume this role was the creation of the Global Public Health Information 
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Network (GPHIN) in 1997 and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN) in 2000. 
 
Since its establishment in 1948, WHO has been entitled by states to conduct surveillance 
of disease outbreaks across the world.7 In tandem with its call for the revision of the IHR, 
WHO argued from 1995 that there was also a need for a global surveillance network 
which could gather outbreak reports from across the world on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week 
basis in order to manage outbreak verification and response.8 This led to the creation of 
the first global infectious-disease surveillance system, the Global Public Health 
Information Network (GPHIN), developed in 1997. The GPHIN, funded entirely by the 
Canadian government, is a web-based electronic system that scans the World Wide Web 
to identify suspected outbreaks.9 The WHO had in place other ‘outbreak alert’ systems, 
such as FluNet for influenza, RabNet for rabies and DengueNet for Dengue. However, 
this new outbreak verification system was not just about disease-outbreak surveillance, 
but a ‘global safety net that protects other countries when one nation’s surveillance and 
response systems fail’.10 GOARN, created in 2000, is a communication network that 
shares diagnoses and outbreak information (from GPHIN) and is also a back-up for when 
states themselves do not have the response capacity or require laboratory diagnosis 
expertise. GOARN, embedded within the Communicable Disease Unit, enables WHO to 
be the first actor on the scene to manage the verification and reporting of disease 
outbreaks, to negotiate with the affected state and surrounding states (if need be) to 
prevent the spread of infection and situate itself as the key authority in infectious-disease 
control or containing the ‘threat’. Previous to SARS, WHO had utilised GOARN to assist 
with outbreaks of Rift Valley fever in Kenya and Somalia, monkey pox and Marburg virus 
infection in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Gabon, 
relapsing fever in southern Sudan, influenza in Afghanistan and epidemic dysentery in 
Sierra Leone.11 
 
Just after the SARS outbreak, Dr David Heymann, then WHO Representative of the 
Director General on the Polio Eradication Initiative, and Dr Guénaël Rodier, then Director 
of the Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, argued that 
many states were not quick enough in diagnosing outbreaks of the disease and containing 
it quickly enough to prevent international spread. In 2003, member states passed a 
resolution calling for ‘increasing national capacity development for surveillance and 
response and endorsed the ways in which GOARN obtained information about SARS and 
supported containment efforts’.12 A second resolution was then passed encouraging 
GOARN to strengthen its surveillance capacity. The revised IHRs now require states to 
develop an internal surveillance and outbreak response capacity by 2012 at the latest.13 
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Another key feature of GOARN, which marks it out from the non-state-led surveillance 
networks that have proliferated under the funding of Google.Org and IBM (both of which 
have the support of WHO headquarters), is that WHO can respond to an outbreak through 
coordinating diagnostic and containment field teams. However, WHO’s entry is dependent 
on the affected state’s verification of an outbreak –WHO cannot send a fieldwork 
response team without state acquiescence–.14 The updated GPHIN system has the 
capability to locate over 20 reports a day of suspected outbreaks. On request by the 
affected state, the GOARN’s Strategic Health Operations Centre (SHOC) can respond to 
outbreaks with field teams, specialised protective equipment and medical supplies, as well 
as robust communications to keep in contact with the state officials and WHO 
headquarters.15 The key phrase here is ‘on request’. Even though WHO is allowed to 
receive outbreak reports from non-state actors, the state is required to verify the outbreak. 
Since the passing of the revised IHR, the question of consent remains pivotal.16 
 
WHO Headquarters argues that its international partnerships under GOARN makes it able 
to maximise its use in a situation where ‘financial, political and institutional’ restraints may 
inhibit cooperation in more specialised, regional surveillance mechanisms. WHO 
representatives argue that not only can WHO’s ‘coordinated response mechanism 
mobilize the appropriate resources that are necessary to contain the outbreak… WHO 
has an international mandate [and this] provides an element of neutrality’.17 In addition, 
under the new IHR, WHO Headquarters can request the country to verify the event and 
acknowledge receipt of this request within 24 hours. One of the incentives for countries to 
report such events is that these will already have been reported via the electronic 
highway: ‘we will be in a much better position to help if we have been involved early on by 
the affected country. The fear of being named and shamed by the media and other 
countries concerned by the situation is in itself an incentive’.18 
 
There are two key questions to ask in relation to the rise of WHO’s role in disease alert 
and response through GPHIN and GOARN. First, can WHO be ‘neutral’ in promoting 
unofficial source gathering for disease outbreak reports, and will the ultimate goal –
securing better state cooperation– be accomplished if it is envisioned that in the early 
stages, naming and shaming may be the only way to get reluctant states to cooperate? 
Such tactics fail to acknowledge the genuine and deeply-felt political reasons for failure to 
verify that could outweigh the perceived risk of being named and shamed. Moreover, if 
naming and shaming fails to deliver in a particular case, the on-going cooperation of the 
government would be very difficult to secure. Secondly, will the threats of naming and 
shaming inhibit international support for the whole surveillance endeavour? The idea that 
GOARN is primarily targeted at developing states could indicate that some officials in the 
Global North believe that the best response to disease outbreaks is to shame states into 
compliance with WHO and GOARN partners (of which the majority are from developed 
states). The danger is that this could come at the expense of international support for 
capacity building in the area of pandemic preparedness. The expectation that developed 
states can handle an outbreak, while it is thought inevitable that developing states cannot, 
may hold some truth but it may not be conducive for establishing cooperation and change 
in state behaviour. In addition, calling upon states to reorganise their health priorities in 
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order to satisfy international demands for improved surveillance and verification overlooks 
the fact that some states have other competing health priorities that pose a more serious 
and immediate threat to their populations. It also omits the fact that expenditure on public 
health is not always at the sole discretion of the developing state. While many states do 
not adequately invest in public health, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
have long been criticised for their strict conditions limiting government investment in public 
health services.19 This brings us to the three concerns identified earlier. 
 
Three Reasons for Caution 
First, state capacity is still weak in regions where the greatest number of new pathogens 
has been diagnosed in the last 20 years. In 2000, professionals within the Communicable 
Disease Unit from WHO headquarters noted that countries subject to complex 
emergencies accounted for 49% of outbreaks, compared with 2% in industrialised 
countries. Not surprisingly, those doing initial reporting of outbreaks were from unofficial 
sources (71%).20 Little has changed in terms of the countries experiencing the majority of 
outbreaks, and the extent of reporting by unofficial sources has actually increased. 
Generally it took 18 days to confirm an outbreak. Of most concern was that it took over 50 
days on average for confirmation of acute respiratory syndrome and meningococcal 
disease –both highly virulent in crowded settings–. While WHO is aware of the response 
weaknesses within such countries –as demonstrated by its introduction of a programme of 
specialised training for epidemiologists and laboratory personnel from developing 
countries–, it is still unclear how international surveillance will benefit individuals suffering 
manifest causes of ill health within such countries. Between June 2007 (when the Site 
was created) and February 2008, the restricted-access Event Information Site received 
information on 231 public health events, with only 10% communicated to WHO through 
National IHR Focal Points.21 
 
We currently lack precise data on where the burden of disease falls for a quarter of the 
world’s population. WHO’s 2007 statistical report includes complete death-cause reports 
for the years 2004 and 2005 from only 64 countries out of 192. More often than not this 
means that the countries without complete registration records also have populations with 
no access to health professionals.22 The concern here is that surveillance will not be of 
much use in situations where the absence of health professionals leads to chronic under-
reporting –yet these countries are the ones where there appears to be an increased risk 
of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) developing–. Not only is 
there limited laboratory capacity in the countries most at risk, there is rarely a local 
medical team available to identify an outbreak in the first place. This creates a heavy 
reliance on unofficial sources for reporting outbreaks –such as non-government agencies 
in the field–, creating tensions for agencies that base their work on political neutrality and 
independence. WHO acknowledges this concern and maintains that GOARN depends on 
‘strong, capable and transparent national systems’.23 WHO has increased its calls for 
investment in health systems strengthening so that states with insufficient public health 
infrastructure can create the means to prevent diseases in the first place, and in turn, 
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identify and report outbreaks. What remains uncertain is whether there is sufficient 
international will to do what it takes to strengthen health systems. 
 
The second obstacle is more political in nature. Being able to identify where a disease 
outbreak has occurred does not alleviate the political obstacles that might exist in gaining 
state cooperation to contain an outbreak. As WHO acknowledges, GOARN is the safety 
net in case an outbreak cannot be contained within a state’s borders. So the question 
then is how do we know if a state has not adequately fulfilled its responsibilities in 
outbreak verification if it lacks either or both the capacity and political will to respond? We 
cannot assume that a state will either (a) know of the outbreak before it has spread 
beyond its national boundaries or (b) not believe that a cover-up is the best means of 
protecting its economy and preventing panic. However, cooperation with the state is 
absolutely vital for effective disease control. For example, increased funding within 
China’s public health system to develop a national based infectious-disease surveillance 
system has been warmly received by many as an indication of China’s acknowledgement 
of the need to improve its public health capacity.24 However, what has received less 
attention is whether it will be possible for disease alerts to be openly discussed and 
disseminated within a very hierarchical and heavily politicised public health system. 
Private discussions by the author with health department officials engaged in shared 
technology discussions with their counterparts in China have revealed concerns that the 
move towards surveillance might not be intended to disclose disease outbreaks, but to 
improve the capacity to cover them up. 
 
Another example of political interference with WHO’s objectives to improve state 
responses to verification requests is the effort to introduce bilateral surveillance systems 
that manage not only outbreak response, but also virus-strain sharing and vaccine 
development. In particular, the US Centre for Disease Control (CDC) has established 
Global Disease Detection Centers (GDDC) in six locations, which are China, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Kenya and Thailand. China’s relationship with GDDC since 2006 
has increased doubts that the country is likely to cooperate with a global surveillance alert 
system because while GOARN requires multilateral cooperation in verification and 
response, the GDDC does not. Although the GDDC is meant to coordinate and share 
outbreak verification information with GOARN, the GDDC primarily uses US government 
departments overseas to respond and collaborate with the local party. In addition, 
GOARN shares all specimens, viruses and bacteria gathered on site through the 
laboratory network; the GDDC does not.25 
 
We see here two types of overt political interference affecting the potential for surveillance 
to work effectively, even if local capacity is permitting. First, a political interest in resisting 
the reporting of an outbreak or verifying a PHEIC due to fear of economic paralysis or 
local reaction to an outbreak triggering a political crises; secondly, an interest in 
monopolising the field response to an outbreak in order to gain access to biological 
samples and exclude WHO from its traditional role of sharing such data through its 
laboratory networks. Against previous analysis that suggested that the willingness of 
Western states to place primary surveillance responsibility in the hands of WHO due to 
their trust in WHO’s authority in the area of global health security, the assumption that 
those states have relinquished their attempt to control the infectious disease agenda 
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requires further investigation. In fact, it could be argued that the only reason why WHO 
has been able to expand its authority under GOARN to the extent that it has is because it 
suited the immediate interests of Western states at the time. What remains untested is 
WHO’s new authority to secure the verification of a disease outbreak within the 24-hour 
period, as stipulated by the revised IHR, and the likelihood of host state compliance with 
disease containment measures. 
 
The third note for caution is that we are yet to establish that more surveillance networks 
create better response to outbreaks by states. What we do know is that the number of 
states notifying WHO of an outbreak is lower than the number of non-state actors notifying 
through the GPHIN system.26 It is uncertain how this system will place pressure on states 
to realise the need to invest in their public health systems if someone else is responding 
to their health crises; nor how it will address the political reluctance of states to notify and 
cooperate with WHO –other than through the name and shame dynamic-, which may be 
too late to take effect in the event of a pandemic outbreak. 
 
The link between increased surveillance and improved response could be misleading. As 
WHO acknowledges, states need to verify an outbreak before any further action can be 
taken to contain the outbreak. The travel advisory warning placed on China during the 
SARS crisis galvanised the state into cooperation with WHO, but China’s moves since 
then to develop its own early warning surveillance mechanism raises questions about 
whether its aim is to improve capacity or to get to the hotspot to cover up the crises before 
anyone starts e-mailing ProMED or CNN. WHO has no authority over states in the event 
of a breach of the IHR verification requirement, unless states within the World Health 
Assembly wish to call a special meeting to consider such actions. 
 
Conclusion: Ultimately we need to figure out how surveillance can contribute to building 
state capacity: not strengthening particular laboratories through special access to virus 
samples or forcing states to do what they would not otherwise wish to do. However, real 
success comes when states cooperate because they know it is the right thing to do and 
believe that the benefits outweigh the consequences. If saving individuals from the 
unheralded spread of an unknown pathogen is the real intention, the best start is to deal 
with political instabilities, the chronically low investment in public health infrastructure in 
much of the developing world due, in part, to constricting international monetary and trade 
policies, and to create incentives for cooperation that overcome the instinctive attempt to 
hide outbreaks. Surveillance is important but it cannot and should not be a substitute for 
building the capacity and willingness of states to act. 
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